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ABSTRACT 
This paper introduces SkyDe (Skype Hide), a new steganographic 
method that utilizes Skype encrypted packets with silence to 
provide the means for clandestine communication. It is possible to 
reuse packets that do not carry voice signals for steganographic 
purposes because Skype does not use any silence suppression 
mechanism. The method’s proof-of-concept implementation and 
first experimental results are presented. They prove that the 
method is feasible and offers steganographic bandwidth as high as 
2.8 kbps. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General, Security 
and protection 
General Terms 
Security, Algorithms 
Keywords 
Information hiding, network steganography, Skype 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Voice over IP (VoIP) or IP telephony is one of the services of the 
IP world that is changing the entire telecommunications 
landscape. It is a real-time service, which enables users to make 
phone calls through data networks that use an IP protocol. 
Currently, one of the most popular of the IP telephony systems 
that have shaken the global telephony market in the last decade is 
Skype (www. skype.com). It is a proprietary P2P telephony 
service originally introduced in 2003 by creators of the famous 
P2P file sharing system Kazaa – Niklas Zennström and Janus 
Friis. Skype is owned by Microsoft and it has been reported that it 
has about 663 million registered users (September 2011). In 
March 2012, it was reported to have had 35 million users online 
simultaneously [5]. It has also been estimated that in 2011, Skype 
had acquired about 33% of the world’s international telephone 
market [18]. 
Steganography encompasses various information hiding 
techniques, the aim of which is to embed a secret message into a 
carrier. Network steganography, to perform hidden 
communication, utilizes network protocols and/or their 
relationships as the carrier for secret data. Because of its 
popularity, IP telephony is becoming a natural target for network 
steganography [6]. Steganographic methods are intended to hide 
the very existence of the communication and therefore, any third-
party observers should remain unaware of the presence of the 
steganographic exchange.  
Generally, every network steganographic method can be described 
by the following set of characteristics: its steganographic 
bandwidth, its undetectability, and robustness [1]. The term 
“steganographic bandwidth” refers to the amount of secret data 
that can be sent per unit time when using a particular method. 
Undetectability is defined as the inability to detect a steganogram 
within a certain carrier. The most popular method by which to 
detect a steganogram is to analyze the statistical properties of the 
captured data and compare them with values typical for that 
carrier. The final characteristic is robustness, which is defined as 
the amount of alteration that a steganogram can withstand without 
its secret data being destroyed. A good steganographic method 
should be as robust and as difficult to detect as possible whilst 
offering the highest bandwidth. However, it must be noted that 
there is always a fundamental trade-off necessary among these 
three measures. 
Additionally, it is also useful to measure the steganographic cost. 
This is a characteristic that belongs to the sphere of carrier fidelity 
and has a direct impact on undetectability. It describes the 
degradation or distortion of the carrier caused by the application 
of the steganographic method. For example, in the case of VoIP 
steganography methods, this cost can be expressed as a measure 
of the conversation quality degradation induced by applying a 
particular technique for hiding information. 
One of the most important aspects for every steganographic 
method is the selection of the most suitable carrier for the secret 
data. The most favorable carrier for secret messages must have 
two features: 
 It should be popular, i.e., usage of such a carrier should not be 
considered as an anomaly in itself. The more such carriers are 
present and utilized on the network the better, because they 
mask the existence of hidden communication. 
 Modification of the carrier related to the embedding of the 
steganogram should not be “visible” to the third party, who is 
unaware of the steganographic procedure.  
Thus, because of its popularity and traffic volume, Skype traffic is 
an ideal candidate for a secret data carrier. It should also be 
emphasized that the purpose of establishing any information 
hiding exchange varies – possible uses can fall into the category 
of legal actions (e.g., circumvention of web censorship and 
surveillance, computer forensics or copyright protection) or illicit 
activity (e.g., criminal communication, confidential data 
exfiltration or industrial espionage). This trade-off is typical in 
steganography and requires consideration in a broader 
steganography context, which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
One can always question why use steganography for Skype, which 
as is commonly known, uses cryptographic means to provide 
confidentiality for every type of users’ message that is exchanged 
(text messages, voice signal, files). First of all, hidden 
communication need not necessarily be conducted in an end-to-
end manner, i.e., covert data can be sent using third party VoIP 
calls. Secondly, discussion has recently arisen on whether Skype, 
whose calls were commonly believed very hard to wiretap, is 
providing lawful interception services to law enforcement 
agencies [7]. Additionally, Skype is proprietary and closed 
software and thus, ultimately cannot be trusted.  
This is why in this paper we discuss how Skype can be utilized to 
provide means for clandestine communication. Experiments 
performed on real Skype traffic prove that the proposed method – 
SkyDe (Skype Hide) – is feasible and offers high steganographic 
bandwidth and reasonable steganographic cost in terms of 
undetectability. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents 
the current state of research efforts on VoIP steganography and on 
Skype in particular. In Section 3, Skype basics are presented, as 
well as an analysis of its traffic and a detailed description of the 
proposed method and the prototype implementation. Next, in 
Section 4, experimental results for the method are presented. 
Finally, the last section concludes our work and indicates 
directions for further research. 
2. RELATED WORK 
A number of steganographic approaches for VoIP have been 
proposed, which have been recently exhaustively surveyed by 
Mazurczyk [1]. Because of space limitations only steganographic 
methods related to Skype and silence suppression mechanisms 
will be mentioned here. 
The only Skype-dedicated method was introduced by Wang et al. 
[4]. The authors proposed embedding a 24-bit watermark into the 
encrypted stream (e.g., Skype call) to track its propagation 
through the network and thus, providing its de-anonymization. 
The watermark is inserted by modifying the inter-packet delay for 
selected packets in the VoIP stream. The authors demonstrated 
that depending on the watermark parameters chosen, they were 
able to achieve a 99% true positive and a 0% false positive rate, 
while maintaining good robustness and undetectability. However, 
they achieved steganographic bandwidth of only about 0.3 bit/s, 
which is enough for the described application, but rather low for 
performing clandestine communication. 
The deployment of speech codecs’ Silence Insertion Description 
(SID) frames that are sent when voice is not present in the input 
signal, was proposed as a secret data carrier by Mazurczyk and 
Szczypiorski [2]. However, the authors noted that the 
steganographic bandwidth for this method is rather low, but that it 
is possible to influence the rate at which SID frames are issued.  
Recently, a high-capacity steganography technique based on the 
utilization of the inactive frames of the G.723.1 speech codec was 
introduced by Huang et al. [3]. The authors proved that the 
inactive frames of VoIP streams are more suitable for data 
embedding than the active ones and thus, a greater amount of 
hidden data can be embedded within them with the same 
imperceptibility. They then proposed a steganographic algorithm 
in different speech parameters of the inactive frames for the 
G.723.1 codec with a 6.3 kbits bitrate. Experimental results show 
the solution is imperceptible and that a quite high steganographic 
bandwidth of up to 101 bits/frame is achieved. 
Proposed in this paper, the SkyDe method operates by reusing 
encrypted packets with silence, by substituting this information 
with secret data. When compared with existing solutions, it is 
characterized by significantly higher steganographic bandwidth 
and good undetectability. 
3. SKYPE TRAFFIC ANALYSIS AND 
PROPOSED METHOD DESCRIPTION 
3.1 Skype basics 
Skype is a hierarchical P2P network with a single centralized 
element (login server) that is formed by two types of nodes [11]:  
 Ordinary Nodes (ONs) that can start and receive a call, send 
instantaneous messages, and transfer files, and  
 Specialized nodes called Super Nodes (SNs) that are 
responsible for helping ONs find and connect to each other 
within the Skype network 
The login server is responsible for the authentication of ONs and 
SNs before they access the Skype network.  
Skype offers two communication modes, namely:, End-to-End 
(E2E) and End-to-Out (E2O). The first is possible between two 
Skype clients within the IP network. The second occurs if one of 
the endpoints is a Skype client within the IP network and the 
other is a PSTN phone (SkypeIn/SkypeOut services). In this 
paper, we focus solely on the Skype E2E mode. 
Skype is based on proprietary protocols and makes extensive use 
of cryptography, obfuscation, and anti-reverse-engineering 
procedures, and all information about its traffic characteristics, 
protocols, and behaviors comes from numerous measurement 
studies, e.g., [8] [9].  
All traffic in Skype is encrypted; neither signaling messages, nor 
the packets that carry voice data can be uncovered. Typically, the 
preferred, first-choice transport protocol of Skype is User 
Datagram Protocol (UDP), which as the traffic analysis in [9] 
showed, is being used in about 70% of all calls. However, if 
Skype is unable to connect using UDP it falls back to TCP. In this 
paper, we focus solely on UDP-based Skype calls. 
 
 
Figure 1. UDP-based Skype message format. 
 
For TCP-based transport, the entire Skype message is encrypted. 
In cases of unreliable UDP, at the beginning of each datagram’s 
payload, an unencrypted header is present that is called the Start 
of Message (SoM). It is unencrypted in order to be able to restore 
the sequence of packets that was originally transmitted, to detect a 
loss, and to quickly distinguish the type of data that is carried 
inside the message. SoM consists of the following two fields [8] 
(Fig. 1): 
 ID (2 bytes) that is used to uniquely identify the message; it is 
randomly selected by the sender query, and copied in the 
receiver reply. 
 Fun (1 byte) that describes the payload type. For example, 
values: 0x02, 0x03, 0x07, and 0x0f are typically used to 
indicate signaling messages (used during the login phase or 
for connection management). 0x0d indicates a DATA message 
that can contain: encoded voice or video blocks, chat 
messages or fragments of files. 
 
Skype estimates the available bandwidth and the packet loss 
probability, and it dynamically adapts to the detected network 
conditions by adjusting the codec’s bitrate or by introducing 
higher redundancy in packets [9]. Typically, the resulting packet 
rate is about 16, 33, or 50 packet/s [11]. 
From the perspective of the steganographic method proposed in 
this paper, it is also important to emphasize that Skype does not 
utilize any silence suppression mechanism, i.e., even if there is no 
voice activity during the conversation, the packets that carry the 
silence are still generated and sent. The lack of support for silence 
suppression is intentional – it helps to obtain better voice quality 
and maintain UDP bindings at the NAT (Network Address 
Translation) [10]. 
3.2 Skype traffic analysis 
For the purpose of the proposed steganographic method, outlined 
in detail in Section 3.3, an analysis of Skype traffic was carried 
out to prove that the method is feasible.  
An experimental test-bed was set up (Fig. 2) that included two 
Skype clients (Skype for Linux v. 2.2.0.35 and for Windows v. 
6.0.60.126) and a Linux-based application designed and 
developed by authors that could intercept Skype packets before 
they reached (for the transmitting side) and after they entered the 
(for the receiving side) network interface. Two instances of this 
application were synchronized using NTP (Network Time 
Protocol) and were responsible for the generation of reports 
regarding the Skype packets’ statistics.  
 
 
Figure 2. Experimental Skype test-bed. 
 
Then, reports from both sides: transmitting and receiving, were 
analyzed and joined in an analyzer. This helps to observe the same 
Skype encrypted stream in two network localizations. 
Using this test-bed, a number of measurements were carried out 
on Skype traffic. In each experiment, the number of analyzed 
Skype packets was larger than 100 000 and was repeated four 
times. Here, only the averaged results are presented. 
3.2.1 Skype packets’ size distribution 
In 2008, Chang et al. [10] observed that in Skype traffic, speech 
activity is highly correlated to packet size, as more information is 
encoded into a voice packet while a user is speaking. 
Experimental results revealed that the packet size and speech 
volume are highly correlated because they fluctuate in tandem. 
This feature of Skype traffic is utilized in SkyDe to identify the 
packets that carry silence. That is why we wanted to verify 
whether the same behavior as in [10] can be observed for current 
Skype software. Fig. 3 presents the obtained experimental results. 
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Figure 3. The distribution of packets’ size during conversation 
and periods of silence. 
 
As can be observed, the previously reported high correlation 
between speech activity and packet size is still evident. This 
means that based on the size of each Skype packet we can assess 
with high probability whether it carries voice or silence. As 
mentioned before, this effect will be also utilized by SkyDe. 
3.2.2 Skype bytes distribution in packets’ payload 
To later prove SkyDe undetectability, the following characteristic 
of Skype bytes distribution for typical Skype calls was carried out 
(Fig. 4). 
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Figure 4. The bytes distribution in packets’ payload for typical 
Skype calls. 
It can be observed that there are certain bytes values (in hex), i.e., 
0x0d, 0x1d, 0x2d, 0x3d, 0x4d, 0x5d, 0x6d, and 0x7d that are 
more frequent than others, whereas the rest are almost equally 
distributed. The popular eight bytes are the typical values from the 
Fun field for each UDP-based Skype packet (see Sec. 3.1). The 
distribution of the rest of the byte values is almost equal because 
they represent the encrypted payload of Skype packets. 
3.2.3 Skype resistance to packet losses 
We also investigated Skype’s maximum threshold of packet losses 
that could be sustained by a UDP-based connection without 
falling back to TCP. It transpired that this value is about 70%. Of 
course, when this level of losses is reached, the voice quality is 
degenerated to the point where no further conversation is 
possible. 
3.3 Proposed method and its implementation 
SkyDe is designed to utilize Skype encrypted voice streams to 
enable clandestine communication. This secret data exchange can 
be realized between: (a) two Skype users, i.e., they use their own 
call for steganographic purposes, or (b) a steganogram transmitter 
and receiver that utilize an existing, third party Skype call (in this 
case the original caller and callee are not aware of the information 
hiding procedure). 
SkyDe utilizes encrypted Skype voice packets as a hidden data 
carrier. By taking advantage of the high correlation between 
speech activity and packet size (described and verified in Sec. 
3.2.1), packets without voice signal can be identified and used to 
carry secret data (by replacing the encrypted silence with secret 
data bits). As is commonly known, typical VoIP calls contain 
35% to 70% silent periods in each direction [12], [13]. Skype 
does not utilize any silence suppression algorithm; thus, generally, 
all packets with silence can be utilized for steganographic 
purposes. However, SkyDe should have potentially low impact on 
voice quality because it does not affect packets with voice signals, 
which are more significant from the point of view of conversation. 
3.3.1 SkyDe transmitting side 
First, to create the secret data to be sent, as with the replaced 
(encrypted) data, they are encrypted prior sending. The 
cryptographic key utilized for encryption is a shared secret 
between SkyDe communication sides. Then a CRC-16 checksum 
is calculated on the payload and is inserted into the ID field (16 
bits) of SoM (see Section 3.1). Such an approach provides 
steganogram integrity verification and facilitates the identification 
of packets that carry secret data at the receiving end.  
Then, those packets that contain silence must be identified. Their 
size can change while the connection lasts (due to network 
conditions), so we propose a “sliding time window” algorithm 
that calculates the reference size of the packet with silence. It is 
also responsible for keeping the total packet losses at a safe level, 
because as mentioned earlier, steganographic utilization of each 
packet with silence will increase the overall packet loss for the 
call. Thus, it is important not to exceed the measured threshold of 
about 70% total packet losses (see subsection 3.2.3) because then 
the connection will fall back to TCP.  
The proposed algorithm works as follows. First, the size of the 
“sliding time window” w (in seconds) is selected, in which the 
reference value r of Skype packets with silence is continuously 
updated during the call. Every second, the packet with the lowest 
size is determined and stored. When all of the values in the 
window are measured, then the average reference value is 
calculated based on the three packets with the lowest size. 
Additionally, a certain deviation in packet size (Δ) r ± Δ is 
acceptable for consideration as a packet for SkyDe purposes. In 
the same time window w, it is also verified whether the total 
packet loss level reached 70% and if it does; the steganographic 
method ceases to utilize packets with silence until the losses are 
again at a safe level. 
After the packets with silence are identified, their payloads are 
replaced with encrypted secret data and they are sent to the 
receiving side. 
To provide reliability for the proposed method, an additional 
protocol in a hidden channel might be required. One solution is to 
use an approach proposed by Hamdaqa and Tahvildari [17] 
because it can be easily incorporated into SkyDe. It provides a 
reliability and fault-tolerance mechanism based on a modified (k, 
n) threshold of a Lagrange Interpolation and the results 
demonstrated in that paper prove that the complexity of 
steganalysis is increased. Of course, the “cost” for the extra 
reliability would always be a loss of some fraction of the 
steganographic bandwidth. 
3.3.2 SkyDe receiving side 
At the receiver side, each packet with silence is recognized by the 
same means (packet size) as at the transmitter side. These packets 
are then copied to the buffer and for each of them, a CRC-16 
checksum is verified and the secret data is extracted. It is not 
important to erase or replace secret data embedded into packets 
because the Skype client will treat these packets as losses. 
However, only the receiving end will be aware of the loss; thus, 
these modified SkyDe packets will not be discarded while 
traveling through the network.  
SkyDe was implemented in the same network environment as 
depicted in Fig. 2, by enhancing the functionality of the 
application that was used to gather statistics about Skype traffic 
(see Section 3.2). Based on the experimental results, it transpired 
that SkyDe performs best when w = 10 seconds and Δ = 20 bytes. 
The selection of the most optimal values of w and Δ will be not 
covered in this paper due to space limitations. 
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
4.1 Experiments methodology 
For SkyDe evaluation, we prepared a .wav file that consists of 
male and female voices speaking English. The .wav file contains 
five minutes of imitated telephone conversation, i.e., sentences 
interleaved with periods of silence (similar to that designed in 
[13]) with a ratio of 55:45 (55% speech activity and 45% silence). 
In our experiments, we compiled the .wav file using audio 
recordings from the TIMIT [14] continuous speech corpus – one 
of the most widely used corpora in the speech recognition 
community. In our analysis, we use the subjective measure MOS 
(Mean Opinion Score) [16] calculated with the Perceptual 
Evaluation of Speech Quality (PESQ) method [15].  
The .wav file was used as the source of the voice signal during the 
Skype call and was saved at the receiving end. Then, the original 
and degraded file were compared through the use of PESQ and 
the resultant MOS-LQO (MOS-Listening Quality, Objective) was 
returned to assess the SkyDe impact on voice quality 
(steganographic cost). During the same experiments, the 
steganographic bandwidth and bytes distribution in the packets’ 
payload (as in Fig. 4) were measured. Each experiment was 
repeated three times and averaged values are presented. 
It is worth noting that during the experiments none of the calls 
was disconnected or reverted to TCP, which proves the correct 
design of the proposed method. 
4.2 Steganographic bandwidth and cost 
Using the methodology presented in the previous subsection, the 
results of steganographic bandwidth and cost were obtained. 
Steganographic bandwidth was calculated by analyzing and 
extracting the secret data from the Skype packets with silence that 
were utilized by SkyDe. Also, for these connections, the 
corresponding voice quality MOS-LLQ scores were determined. 
First, the reference MOS-LLQ value without SkyDe applied was 
obtained. It transpired that the resulting quality is about 3.94, 
which is considered to be a good quality. The steganographic cost 
is then determined as a difference between the reference MOS-
LLQ without steganography and that with SkyDe applied. The 
steganographic utilization of packets with silence was increased in 
a range from 0% to 100% and the obtained results regarding voice 
quality are presented in Fig. 5. 
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Figure 5. Voice quality experimental results 
 
When up to 20% of the packets with silence are utilized for 
steganographic purposes, the resulting voice quality is not 
degraded at all. For 30%, the disruption in voice quality is 
negligible. For higher utilization rates, the quality begins to 
deteriorate more quickly and after exceeding 50% it is considered 
as poor; however, conversation is still possible. 
Table 1. Experimental results  
Packets with 
silence 
utilization [%] 
0 20 30 40 50 60 80 100 
Steganographic 
bandwidth 
[kbps] 
N/A 1.37 1.83 1.52 1.5 1.81 2.47 2.78 
Steganographic 
cost 
N/A 0 0.14 0.71 1.21 1.3 1.49 1.54 
Packets with 
silence 
reference size 
[B] 
 
37.86 
 
 
35.95 
 
 
33.98 
 
 
35.23 
 
48.98 
 
48.42 
 
46.10 43.82 
Packet rate 
[packet/s] 
50.17 49.14 45.61 23.68 
 
17.08 
 
 
16.97 
 
17.17 17.84 
The results of SkyDe steganographic bandwidth and cost are 
presented in Table 1. With up to 30% utilization of SkyDe, the 
steganographic bandwidth continues to increase to finally reach 
about 1.8 kbps. This must be considered as a high steganographic 
bandwidth. For higher utilization rates, the steganographic 
bandwidth drops because of the decrease in packet rate – this is 
Skype’s reaction to the elevated level of overall packet losses. For 
40% utilization rate, it drops almost a half (from about 46 to 24 
packet/s) and continues to decrease until it reaches levels of 17 
packet/s. Simultaneously, the size of the packets increases even by 
36% (for 50% to 60% silence utilization rate). This explains the 
drop in resulting steganographic bandwidth to the level of 1.5 
kbps and then the subsequent rise to the point of about 2.8 kbits 
for 100% utilization rate. 
Thus, the proper selection of the level of utilization of packets 
with silence is necessary and typically, it will be a trade-off 
between Skype call quality, desired steganographic bandwidth, 
and undetectability.  
4.3 Undetectability 
4.3.1 User perspective 
Detection of SkyDe, as well as steganographic bandwidth, 
depends on the hidden communication scenario in which it is 
utilized. SkyDe can be used between two Skype clients that are 
aware of the steganographic procedure (secret data is sent in an 
end-to-end manner), or some intermediary nodes can rely on third 
party Skype calls to exchange steganograms. In the first case, 
users can select the desired steganographic bandwidth because 
they do not necessarily expect high voice quality. Additionally, 
they do not care about the elevated overall packet loss level; thus, 
they are able to transmit about 3 kbps. However, in the latter case, 
the degradation of voice quality or introduced losses cannot be 
excessive because it could make overt users suspicious. Thus, this 
could potentially limit the maximum steganographic bandwidth 
that could be achieved. Therefore, from the point of view of voice 
quality and packet losses, SkyDe would be most undetectable for 
30% utilization of packets with silence rate (1.8 kbps of 
steganographic bandwidth). 
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Figure 6. The bytes distribution in packets’ payload for 
SkyDe. 
4.3.2 Network perspective 
To prove that the proposed method is difficult to detect, we 
performed similar experiments with bytes distribution in packets’ 
payload (Fig. 4). It was conducted for SkyDe utilizing 100% of 
packets with silence. The obtained results are presented in Fig. 6. 
To determine to what extent the results are similar to those of Fig. 
4, we used correlation coefficients to quantity the strength of their 
relationship. It transpired that the correlation coefficient between 
the bytes distribution in packets’ payload for typical Skype and 
SkyDe calls is 0.96, which indicates a very strong relationship. 
This makes the proposed steganographic method very difficult to 
detect. 
However, if someone is monitoring Skype traffic, e.g., the packets 
rate and their sizes, then for SkyDe, higher utilization rates could 
be more easily visible (of course, if the monitoring entity were 
able to distinguish between worsening network conditions and 
hidden communication). Therefore, for this case also, utilization 
rates that mimic typical Skype call parameters should be used, i.e., 
up to 30% utilization of packets with silence (almost no difference 
in packets rate and sizes from typical Skype calls). 
It should be also noted that for poorer network conditions, the 
more non-steganographic losses would be introduced and the less 
steganographic information could be transferred due to the 70% 
total packet losses limit. 
It is also important to add that we also observed that the results 
could be different and fluctuate depending on the day of the week 
(working days or weekend), or even depending on the time of the 
day (office or non-office hours). These changes in Skype traffic 
were also discovered in other studies, e.g., in [9]. This fact also 
works in the favor of SkyDe because it would be difficult to 
establish some baseline values needed for steganalysis purposes. 
Therefore, this makes SkyDe more difficult to detect. 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper we introduced SkyDe, a steganographic method that 
utilizes encrypted Skype packets as a hidden data carrier. By 
taking advantage of the high correlation between speech activity 
and packet size in Skype, we identify those without voice and use 
them to carry secret data. Experimental results show that such an 
approach offers a high steganographic bandwidth of up to 1.8 
kbps (for 30% utilization of packets with silence), whilst 
introducing almost no distortion to the Skype call. Moreover, we 
prove that in these circumstances, the method operates under 
terms of undetectability. 
It should be also noted that SkyDe can be also used for other IP 
telephony systems that encrypt their traffic and follows the same 
relationship between speech activity and packet size. Chang et al. 
[10] point that this is also a case for UGS (Unsolicited Grant 
Service) [19]. 
Future work will include developing an improved SkyDe 
algorithm for the selection of packets with silence that can 
increase the steganographic bandwidth whilst keeping the voice 
distortion at a safe level. We will also conduct more in-depth 
studies by taking into account different parts of the week or day. 
We are also going to experiment with SkyDe resistance to 
network packet losses and their influence on the performance of 
the proposed steganographic method. Moreover, we will pursue 
the effective steganalysis method for SkyDe.  
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